



Security Council

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Letter dated 22 April 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour, in my capacity as the coordinator of ECOWAS Ambassadors in New York, to forward the report of the ECOWAS Mission to Côte d'Ivoire on the situation as at 15 April 2003 (annex I) and the Force Commander's operational review of March 2003 (annex II), for circulation as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nana **Effah-Apenteng**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex I to the letter dated 22 April 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]

Subject: Economic status report, 15 April 2003

I. Summary

In the last two months the establishment of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) was completed and it assumed tactical responsibility along the ceasefire line in place of the French forces.

Supported by unquestionable international legitimacy and accepted by all the parties to the conflict, working in close cooperation with the French force Operation Unicorn, ECOMICI immediately set about its mission to ensure security both by seeking to separate former belligerents in the centre of the country and by providing security for the authorities of the Government of National Reconciliation at Yamoussoukro and Abidjan.

Having participated with unquestioned success in the complex and sensitive VIP protection mentioned above, having organized several multipartite meetings aimed at bringing former adversaries to the negotiating table to settle as soon as possible the various problems involved in the general normalization process and having responded appropriately to its baptism of fire along the ceasefire line on 2 April in sector I (Benin sub-group), ECOMICI quickly proved itself to be a major actor in the process of ending the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire.

This largely multinational force exists, it is fully operational and it proves its impartiality, usefulness, value and ability to adapt every day. Its major problem today is its continued financing, which is for the moment uncertain beyond the end of April. Its future, once the challenge of financing it has been met and its ranks have been strengthened, might be to expand its action in the field in order to help effect a return to normality in the broad sense in Côte d'Ivoire, by bringing its efforts to bear on trade security and the disarmament of undesirable elements once the situation has been calmed and the law restored.

II. ECOMICI now exists, and has come at the right time

On 29 March 2003, at the Zambakro Peacekeeping School, the purely symbolic headquarters of its centre of operations, ECOMICI solemnly accepted responsibility for monitoring the ceasefire agreement along the ceasefire line. The ceremony marking that transfer of authority was illustrative in bringing together two forces, Operation Unicorn and ECOMICI, which had a mandate from the international community to promote a return to peace for all the components of Ivorian society. The splendour of that ceremony marked the culmination of the considerable efforts that had led to the establishment of an inter-African force of 1,300 men from five nations contributing virtually the same number of troops. Building that force was difficult work, as is always the case in a multinational

context, but it was unquestionably successful, with a cost-effectiveness ratio that was noticed in international circles.

At a time when the contradictory approaches of the peace and war movements still seem to be in confrontation within all the forces involved, it is particularly necessary for ECOMICI to demonstrate an inter-African approach devoid of bilateralism and strong subregional will, both appropriate qualities for negotiating the difficult road to peace.

III. Competent staff of high moral character

Thanks to the efforts of the contributing countries, the 1,300 men of ECOMICI form a high-quality human and military ensemble whose varied experience in the area of peacekeeping operations is a significant asset. Many of them have taken training course or served as interns in international bodies both in Africa and France. Many have participated in inter-African exercises organized by the major international partners, France, the United States and Great Britain. Finally, many officers share the experience of basic training courses, general staff courses or advanced military training courses. ECOMICI's bilingualism, far from causing a problem, enriches the force, through the command post level, with varied military and operational cultures, that provide it with an advantage in standing up to deeply divided factions and will help it work subsequently, if need be, with partners from throughout the world in a United Nations framework. Strengthened by the legitimacy and international recognition of their work, the military personnel of ECOMICI are aware of the importance of their mission to help their Ivorian brothers, which is a source of strong professional pride.

IV. Generally satisfactory logistics

After a build-up phase that was naturally difficult owing to the wide range of contributing countries (ECOWAS, France, United States, Great Britain, Belgium), of civilian and military actors (ministers of defence and foreign affairs, embassies, members of civil society under contract) and of procedures specific to each country, but also owing to the expanse and constraints of the deployment area (more than 400 km along the ceasefire line), and the length of the lines (250 km between Abidjan and Yamoussoukro), ECOMICI is beginning to attain its own cruising speed from the logistical point of view, and also receives, whenever possible, assistance from the Operation Unicorn force. The host country, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, also seems to be honouring its responsibilities in this area increasingly well (by making premises and vehicles available).

The main efforts to be made at this time concern the areas of health support and protection of transmissions and office automation.

V. Context in which ECOMICI is being used

Although it has been assuming its tactical responsibilities for only a few weeks, ECOMICI already has extensive experience in the monitoring and management of the Ivorian crisis. This is due to a series of anticipatory measures

taken, such as the early appointment of the Force Commander, participation of the Force Commander in the monitoring committee, rapid establishment of his general staff, sending of advance parties, area reconnaissance missions, coordination and preparation of the deployment with the Operation Unicorn forces. All those measures made it possible for the Force Commander to make an independent evaluation of the local situation as soon as authority was transferred. That evaluation can be summarized as follows:

In the field, the situation is deceptively calm: fires are still smouldering. In Abidjan there are signs that the situation is calming down; the curfew has been shortened and the violent street demonstrations have decreased, but restrictions on the Operation Unicorn forces' freedom of movement and racketeering continue to be frequent. Along the ceasefire line, attempts by the New Forces to infiltrate towards the south are still taking place along the entire width of the line (observed in sectors I and V). On the other side it is necessary to negotiate every inch of the way to avoid a form of spillover towards the north by certain elements of the Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) and to guard against an excessive and particularly counter-productive use of MI-24 attack helicopters. Although the situation in western Côte d'Ivoire, is not directly ECOMICI's problem, there is a very real risk of contagion there. The most recent events have shown that the least spark attracts many who are prepared to fan the embers.

Politically speaking, the leaders of all the political parties involved are extremely distrustful. A most striking example of this is the paranoia regarding security that permeates the atmosphere at meetings of councils of ministers and defence councils. The appointment, travel to Abidjan, accommodation and start of work of the New Forces ministers are the subject of all sorts of fears, rumours and doubts, which must be countered by the exemplary behaviour of an impartial security force like ECOMICI. In addition, as the negotiations progress, care must be taken in dealing with minor "military" leaders (found on all sides) who might feel they have been betrayed or have lost standing as heads of rural or urban gangs.

VI. ECOMICI's first operations

On 11 March, although it had neither yet been deployed nor attained its full complement, ECOMICI was asked to participate alongside the Ivorian police and Operation Unicorn forces in the difficult mission of ensuring the security of the meeting of defence councils and councils of ministers taking place in Yamoussoukro. Those were sensitive operations in a context of extreme distrust, requiring complex preparation and coordination and using a considerable number of troops whereas the force had for the most part just been established. The calm and professional attitude and the experience of the members of the force who participated were noticed by all the actors involved and reported in the press.

Immediately after the transfer of authority on 29 March, the force had to deal with its first armed incident, in the community of Bediala in sector I. Thus was ECOMICI quite involuntarily given the opportunity to show both its determination to deal with incidents when they arose, its discipline in and out of action and its full tactical coherence with the French troops of Operation Unicorn who had intervened at its request, in conformity with the operational procedures agreed on by the two Force Commanders, to help manage the de-escalation of the situation.

Finally, also long before the transfer of authority, and thanks to the operational support provided throughout a long period of reconnaissance and coordination with the Operation Unicorn units, ECOMICI engaged very early on, with its own style, in meetings with local civilian and military authorities and the authorities of the forces involved, a process intended as the continuation of a general approach aimed at relaxing attitudes. Now that bilateral meetings between ECOMICI and FANCI and ECOMICI and the New Forces have been held, tripartite meetings are beginning to be organized, with relative success in view of the extent of the dispute between FANCI and the New Forces.

VII. Unresolved problems of ECOMICI

Satisfaction at having completed the essential stage of establishment and transfer of authority should not be used to avoid addressing the force's current weaknesses.

Insufficient human and technical resources at the political-military level in Abuja are what most impede the strategic planning and support with which the force should be provided. Any action taken to correct that insufficiency (for example, the SHIRBRIG (Stand-by High Readiness Brigade) mission or the appointment of counsellors by allies and friendly countries, either within or outside ECOWAS) should be given encouragement by the Executive Secretariat. In this connection, the recent visit to the force by a mission from Abuja was a promising event.

Another fact that cannot be evaded is that, now that the transfer of authority has taken place ECOMICI has achieved all that it can hope to achieve with its current strength of 1,300 troops. Studies done by ECOWAS of whether to increase the force to 3,205 troops to provide it with further capacity should be taken into account in some way by the international community.

Finally, lack of financing on the horizon is obviously a major problem. If nothing is done in the short term, it will be extremely difficult to do effective budgetary planning without resources in view. That would lead to taking short-sighted decisions, reacting without ever being able to anticipate a situation and dealing only with emergencies, which obviously increases costs.

VIII. ECOMICI's future prospects

ECOMICI's future needs to be financed, but not designed. Everything is spelled out in Security Council resolution 1464 (2003) and the Linas-Marcoussis agreements, and has only to be implemented.

In this connection, the force is making a particular effort to organize bilateral, followed by multilateral, meetings with factions and parties in order to bring them together around specific cases to be resolved locally. Hence it is possible to address problems involving movement of goods and persons, re-opening of telephone stations and hours of markets. The general idea is to persuade them to accept a buffer zone which will then become an area of confidence. That will make it possible to avoid a sudden resurgence of the crisis, to put distance between men and weapons and to facilitate civilian and economic movement. Such a re-opening of humanitarian and/or economic corridors has essentially begun in some places, and a

positive manifestation thereof should shortly take place with the reopening of train service between Abidjan and Ouagadougou. Regrouping and disarmament are items that remain on the agenda of the crisis settlement process, but that cannot be implemented until a major psychological hurdle has been overcome in terms of establishing security and a sense of security.

IX. Conclusion

In conclusion, the ECOMICI Force Commander emphasizes the now-apparent operational capacity of his force to fulfil the mission entrusted to it, its impressive multinational aspect and the effective way in which it was established, its excellent cost-effectiveness ratio and the present need, at the international level, to provide the finances that will ensure its future in the service of peace and reconciliation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire.

Annex II to the letter dated 22 April 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

Force Commander's operational review, March 2003

References

- A. Special Working Group Report dated February 2003.
- B. Final Report of the 5th Defence and Security Commission Meeting, held in Accra from 4-5 March 2003.

Introduction

1. Following the signing on 24 January 2003 of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord in France and the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution (SCR) 1464 of 4 February 2003, authorizing a United Nations Chapter VII peace enforcement role for the ECOWAS and French forces in Côte d'Ivoire, there arose the need to review aspects of the operations of the Peace Mission which appeared to be at variance with the Accord and the UNSCR.

2. At the 5th DSC meeting in Accra from 4-5 March 2003, certain decisions were taken as outlined in the Summary of Decisions paragraph of reference B. On 6 March 2003, the Chairman of ECOWAS held an extraordinary meeting in Accra with the heads of all the political forces of Côte d'Ivoire. This meeting led to a swift change in the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire. Subsequently, it has become necessary to review the operations of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) to meet the new realities on the ground.

Review of the current situation

3. Since the extraordinary meeting with the heads of the political forces in Côte d'Ivoire was convened in Accra by the Chairman of ECOWAS on 6 March 2003, the following events have taken place:

- a. Meeting of the National Security Council in Yamoussoukro on Tuesday, 11 March 2003.
- b. The formation and inauguration of the Government of National Reconciliation on Thursday, 13 March 2003 at Yamoussoukro.

4. Since these events, the political atmosphere has improved considerably and all political forces have come on board, necessitating a review of the operational requirements of ECOMICI.

New ECOMICI Mandate

5. At the 5th DSC meeting in Accra, a new Mandate was accepted as follows:
 - a. To contribute to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord.
 - b. To take the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their Personnel, Observers and Humanitarian Agencies.
 - c. To ensure, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of National Reconciliation, the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their Zones of Operation, using all means available to them.
 - d. To monitor the cessation of hostilities.
 - e. To facilitate the free movement of persons, goods and services.
 - f. To contribute to the implementation of the programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all forces.

Concept of operations

6. As a result of these new developments, the following is my reviewed CONOPS:

- a. **Phase I**

- (1) To complete the Transfer of Authority (TOA) between the French force and ECOMICI forces along the Cease Fire Line (Line of Separation).
- (2) To contribute to the provision of security for members of the Government of National Reconciliation in accordance with the Linas-Marcoussis Accord, together with the French force and local security forces.

- b. **Phase II**

To expand operations and show presence throughout the country in sectors, in order to restore confidence among people.

- c. **Phase III**

To assist in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme.

- d. **Phase IV**

Adjustment, Draw-down and Withdrawal (ADW) of the Mission.

Revised force levels

7. The revised levels by phases are as below:

a. **Phase I**

- | | |
|---|--------------------|
| (1) Transfer of Authority on the CFL | = 1,292 All Ranks. |
| (2) Aviation Unit | = 92 All Ranks. |
| (3) Level II medical facility | = 80 All Ranks. |
| (4) Contribute to Security of Government members | = 300 specialists. |
| (5) United Nations Military Observers | = 90 UNMOS. |
| (6) Logistic support elements | = 230 All Ranks. |
| (7) Fifteen (15) specialized tasks: dentist (1),
dental technician (2), nurses (8), translators (2)
and interpreters (2). | |

New force level Phase I = **2,009** All Ranks
and **90** UNMOS.

b. **Phase II**

- | | |
|--|------------------------------------|
| (1) Expansion of operations and showing presence throughout the country. | |
| (a) 6 x CTs (6 x 173) + 1 PL (33) | = 1,071 All Ranks. |
| (b) Combat Engineers | = 125 All Ranks. |
| (2) New force level (1,981 + 125 + 1,071) | = 3,205 All Ranks
and 90 UNMOS. |

c. **Phase III**

To assist in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) Troops — Same level as in Phase II. | |
| (2) UNMOS — 60 additional. | |
| (3) CIVPOL/Gendarmes. | } To be
determined by
ECOWAS
Secretariat |
| (4) Electoral officials. | |
| (5) Non-Governmental Organizations. | |

New force level — 3,205 and 150 UNMOS.

d. **Phase IV**

Adjustment, Draw-down and Withdrawal.
Details later.

e. Summary of force levels — *See Annex A.*

Logistics requirements

8. The logistics requirements based on the new force level cover the following areas:

- a. Financial estimates.
- b. Feeding.
- c. Transportation.
- d. Medical.

9. **Financial Estimates.** Attached as Annex A to this report are the financial estimates by phases for a period of 6 months. The estimates are based on the approved ECOWAS budget of €1,384.5 per man per month. Below is a summary.

- a. Phase I: €16,688,763.00 for 2,009 All Ranks.
- b. Phase II: €26,623,935.00 for 3,205 All Ranks.
- c. Phase III: €26,623,935.00 for 3,205 All Ranks.
- d. Phase IV: To be determined later.

10. **Feeding.** The plan now is to establish a logistics base capable of supplying all contingents in bulk with their requirements for non-perishable rations. This forms two thirds of the feeding allowance of four euros (€4) while the remaining one third is for local purchase of perishable food items.

11. **Transportation.** Phase II requires the expansion of ECOMICI into the territory of the new forces. The implication is that the force would have to improve its mobility in order to effectively cover the entire territory. This requirement should be in the form of troop carrying vehicles (TCVs), armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and fixed and rotary winged aircraft. It is therefore requested that the issue of the provision of an aviation unit for the force should be pursued as a matter of urgency. In view of the need for long range patrols that would result from the expansion, the road transport situation of ECOMICI needs to be substantially improved to ensure operational efficiency. The fact that the Pacific Architect Engineers (PAE) vehicles currently being used by the Mission are old and occasionally unreliable brings to the fore the need to improve the road transport situation of the Mission.

12. **Medical.** At the moment there are 1,292 troops on the ground without an organic Level II Medical Facility. This is causing a serious concern within the Mission. Even first line medical supplies are inadequate as they have almost been exhausted already. Since Nigeria has offered to provide the Level II Medical Facility, it is recommended that the ECOWAS Secretariat pursue this matter vigorously.

Legal Matters

13. **Memorandum of Understanding.** A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) should exist between ECOMICI and the French forces since both forces are already operating together. A draft MOU has been presented by Ecoforce to the French for approval. Hopefully, it will soon be signed by both parties. There is still no MOU

between ECOWAS and Troop Contributing Countries to regularize the logistics framework of the force.

14. **ECOWAS directives to COMFORCE.** ECOWAS Executive Secretariat should urgently validate the proposed Rules of Engagement (ROE) to allow them to be used by the ECOWAS force.

Decisions of the 5th Defence and Security Commission meeting

15. It is suggested that the ECOWAS Secretariat and all stakeholders take action to fulfil most of the decisions taken at the 5th DSC meeting in Accra (as outlined at paragraph 38 of the final report) such as:

- the offer by Nigeria to provide Level II Medical Facility;
- a request for contribution from member countries to provide specialized personnel as follows: three hundred (300) gendarmes (CIVPOL), one (1) dentist, two (2) dental technicians, eight (8) nurses, two (2) translators, two (2) interpreters;
- issue directives (logistic and operations);

Conclusion

16. Events since the extraordinary meeting in Accra of the ECOWAS Chairman with the heads of all political forces of Côte d'Ivoire on 6 March 2003 have necessitated the need to review the operations of ECOMICI. The review covered the concept of operations, the force levels and the logistics requirements.

17. The new CONOPS has 4 phases as outlined at paragraph 6. The review has also determined new force levels as follows:

- a. Phase 1: 2,009 All Ranks and 90 UNMOs.
- b. Phase 2: 3,205 All Ranks and 90 UNMOs.
- c. Phase 3: 3,205 All Ranks and 150 UNMOs.
- d. Phase 4: Details later.

18. The review further identified logistics requirements in the areas of finance, feeding, transportation, and medical.

Recommendations

19. The following recommendations are submitted for consideration:

- a. Pursuant to the new CONOPS the new force levels proposed are required for the fulfilment of the mission.
- b. ECOWAS Secretariat should request member countries for contributions.
- c. The financial estimates in Annex A to the report should be approved as soon as possible to facilitate the execution of the Mandate of the Mission.

- d. Every effort should be made to improve the mobility of the Mission, in particular the deployment of an aviation unit as prescribed in reference A.
- e. That the ECOWAS Secretariat be impressed upon to rigorously pursue the offer by Nigeria to provide a Level II Medical Facility.
- f. That all the outstanding legal issues such as the MOU and ROEs be resolved.
- g. That the ECOWAS Secretariat and all other stakeholders are enjoined to facilitate approval of the decisions of the 5th DSC meeting held in Accra from 4-5 March 2003 for implementation.

Annex

- A/ Summary of force levels in phases.
- B/ Financial estimates for the new force levels.
- C/ Transportation assets required in phases.

Annex A

Summary of force levels in phases

1. **Phase I**
 - a. Security for VIPs = 300 specialists
 - b. Aviation unit = 92 All Ranks
 - c. Level II Medical Facility = 80 All Ranks
 - d. Logistics support elements = 230 All Ranks
 - e. United Nations Military Observers = 90 UNMOs
 - f. Specialized personnel = 15
2. New force level = 2,009 All Ranks and 90 UNMOs
3. Additional troops required = 717 All Ranks and 90 UNMOs
4. **Phase II**
 - a. 6 x CTs (6 x 173) and 1 x PL (33) = 1,071 All Ranks
 - b. Combat Engineers = 125 All Ranks
5. New force level (2,009 + 125 + 1,071) = 3,205 All Ranks and 90 UNMOs
6. Additional troops required = 1,913 All Ranks
7. **Phase III**
Same strength as in Phase II
8. **Phase IV**
Details to be determined later.

Annex B

Financial estimates for new force levels

Phase	Force level	Approved budget/man/month (euros)	Force level budget per month (euros)	Force level budget for 6 months (euros)	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
One (I)	2 009	1 384.5	2 781 460.50	4 437 322.50	
Two (II)	3 205	1 384.5	16 688 763.00	26 623 935.00	
Three (III)	3 205	1 384.5	16 688 763.00	26 623 935.00	Same as phase II
Four (IV)		To be determined subsequently			

Notes:

1. SRES to inform ECOWAS Secretariat of the need to provide the funds to cover the budget for the first Mandate (6 months).
2. **1,384.5 euros/man/month** covers per diem, feeding and personal gear and equipment.

Annex C

Land and air transportation assets required

Phases	Truck 4 WD	VAB/ APC	AFV/AML	Truck 20 T	TCU TT	Ambulance	Wrecker	Gas tank truck	Water tank	Trailer 1 T	Bus	Pick-up	Aéronefs	Obs
Phase 1	4	3	14	-	40	-	-	2	-	-	-	25	01 M1 8 01 AM26	
Phase 2	24	170	34	5	150	15	15	6	20	20	5	60	01 ANT 26 04 M1 8 01 Héli liaison	
Phase 3	24	170	34	5	150	15	15	6	20	20	5	60	01 ANT 26 04 M1 8 01 Héli liaison	
Phase 4	Other matters to be determined subsequently													